For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N ) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a pro le of mixed actions such that at least (1 − ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.
INTRODUCTION
Complexity of equilibria has been studied in several complexity models. In particular, computational complexity, query complexity, and communication complexity. Due to recent developments in the eld, the computational complexity and the query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria are quite well understood, even for constant approximation value (see Section 3 for de nitions):
• For constant ϵ, there exists a quasi-polynomial algorithm for ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games [LMM03] . Under the "Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD", no better algorithm exists [Rub16] . For better approximation value of ϵ = 1 N the problem becomes PPADcomplete [DGP09, CDT09] . For constant ϵ, it is PPAD-hard to compute an ϵ-Nash equilibrium in succinctly representable n-player Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. STOC '17, Montreal, Canada Theorem (Main Theorem, informal). There exists a constant ϵ > 0, such that:
2-player ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games requires poly(N ) communication. n-player ϵ-Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games require 2 Ω(n) communication. In fact, we prove the exponential lower bound even for a weaker notion of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, where it is allowed that ϵ-fraction of the players will play an arbitrary action (not necessarily an ϵ-best-reply).
Uncoupled Dynamics
An underling assumption of the Nash equilibrium solution is that players predict correctly the (mixed) action of their opponents (or alternatively predict correctly their expected payo at each action). One justi cation for this problematic assumption, which appears in the seminal work of John Nash [Nas51] , is that in some scenarios players may learn the behaviour of their opponents in cases where the game is played repeatedly. This idea led to an extensive study of learning dynamics and their convergence to Nash equilibrium, see e.g. [You04, HMC13, KL93] . One natural, and general, class of adaptive dynamics is that of uncoupled dynamics [HMC03, HMC06] where it is assumed that players do not know the utilities of their opponents (but observe their past behaviour). The question on the existence of uncoupled dynamics that lead to Nash equilibrium is quite well understood [FY06, HMC06, GL07, Bab12] . Several uncoupled dynamics that converge to approximate Nash equilibrium (or pure Nash equilibrium [You09] ) are known. All these dynamics are based on an exhaustive search principle, where at the moment a player realizes she is acting sub-optimally she updates her action to a random one (rather than to an optimal one or a better one). One criticism of these dynamics is that convergence to equilibrium may take an unreasonably long time in large games where the exhaustive search is done over a large space. This led to the study of the rate of convergence of uncoupled dynamics. As pointed out by [CS04] for every solution concept (in particular equilibria solutions), the (randomized) communication complexity of a solution is identical (up to a logarithmic factor) to the rate of convergence by any (randomized) uncoupled dynamics to the solution. This observation initiated the communication complexity study in games. As was mentioned above, the communication complexity, and thus also the rate of convergence of uncoupled dynamics, was known only for exact or pure Nash equilibrium. The question on the rate of convergence of uncoupled dynamics to approximate Nash equilibrium was an open question. Given the fact that all known positive results introduce dynamics that converge to approximate Nash equilibrium, this question is central. Our Main Theorem resolves this open question, yielding the following negative result:
Corollary 1 (Uncoupled Dynamics). There exists a constant ϵ > 0 such that any uncoupled dynamics requires:
2-player at least poly(N ) rounds to converge to an ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games.
n-player at least 2 Ω(n) rounds to converge to an ϵ-Nash equilibrium (or even (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium) in n-player binary-action games.
Techniques
Proving communication complexity lower bounds for Nash equilibrium is notoriously challenging for two reasons. The rst reason, as is common in hardness of Nash equilibrium in other models, is totality: there always exists at least one (exact) equilibrium, and the proof of existence induces a non-trivial (yet ine cient) algorithm for nding it. In order to construct hard instances we must carefully hide the equilibrium (we can't just remove it), and make sure that the above algorithm is indeed ine cient for our instances.
Another reason for the communication complexity of approximate equilibrium being an open question for a long time is the fact that there exist e cient non-deterministic communication protocols (polylog(N ) for two-player, poly(n) for n-player): veri cation of equilibrium (exact or approximate) requires only constant communication, and small-representation approximate equilibria always exist (e.g. by [LMM03] ). Therefore, the communication complexity lower bounds for approximate equilibria, as we prove in the present paper, show an exponential gap between the non-deterministic and randomized (or even deterministic) communication complexity of a total search problem. We are certainly not the rst to show such separations, see e.g. [RW90, KRW95, RM99] 3 . But such separations are still not very common in communication complexity, and for a good reason: for decision problems, they are impossible! The deterministic communication complexity is upper-bounded by the product of the non-deterministic and co-non-deterministic communciation complexities [AUY83] . In this work, we overcome both obstacles by combining techniques from hardness of Nash equilibrium in other models [HPV89, MT05, Shm12, Bab14, Rub16] together with the recent simulation theorem for randomized communication complexity [AGJ + 17, GPW17] . We note that even given all those techniques, several challenges must be overcome, as is evident by [RW16] . The main steps in our proofs are as follows. First, we prove a randomized query complexity hardness result for the problem of nding the end of a line in a particular constant-degree graph. Then we use a simulation theorem of [AGJ + 17, GPW17] to "lift" this query complexity hardness result to randomized communication complexity hardness. We use a construction of [HPV89, Rub16] to embed this line as a continuous Lipschitz function
we build on ideas from [MT05, Shm12, Bab14] to construct a twoplayer (respectively n-player) "imitation game" that simulates both the short communication protocol for the computation of f , as well as a xed-point veri cation. In particular, every (approximate) Nash equilibrium of the game corresponds to an approximate xed-point of f , which in turn corresponds to an end of a line. Proof overview appears in Section 2.1. The formal proofs appear in Section 4.
Additional Related Literature
For two-player N × N games and ϵ ≈ 0.382, [CDF + 15] show that polylog(N ) communication is su cient for computing an ϵ-approximate Nash equilibrium (improving over a protocol for ϵ ≈ 0.438 due to [GP14] ). For the related notion of correlated equilibrium, in n-player games with a constant number of actions, it is known that even exact correlated equilibrium can be computed using only poly(n)-communication, see [HM10, PR08, JLB15] . Interestingly, for exact correlated equilibria, there is an exponential gap between the above communication protocol and the query complexity lower bound of [HN13, BB15] . Further discussion on correlated equilibria appears in Section 5.
For the related problem of nding a xed point, [RW16] study the communication complexity of approximate xed point of the decomposition. Namely, Alice holds a Lipschitz function f ∶ A → B Bob holds a Lipschitz function ∶ B → A, where A and B are compact convex sets, and their goal is to compute a xed point of the decomposition ○ f . [RW16] prove that the following version of this problem is communicationally hard: nd an approximate xed point of ○ f on a grid of A, when it is promised that such an approximate xed point on the grid exists (the problem is not total).
As discussed earlier, the main motivation for studying the (communication) complexity of Nash equilibrium is understanding its relevance as a predictive solution concept. This is a good place to mention a recent work of Roughgarden [Rou14] , which highlights another important motivation for studying the complexity of Nash equilibrium: understanding the quality of equilibria. The Price of Anarchy (POA) of a game is the ratio between the social welfare (sum of players' utilities) in an optimum strategy pro le, and the social welfare in the worst Nash equilibrium of that game. Roughgarden [Rou14] provides the following widely applicable recipe for lower bounds on PoA: if a Nash equilibrium can be found e ciently (in particular, via the non-deterministic protocol due to [LMM03] ), but approximating the optimal social welfare requires a higher communication complexity (even for non-deterministic protocols, e.g. by reduction from set disjointness), then clearly not all Nash equilibria yield high social welfare.
RESULTS AND PROOF OVERVIEW
For two-player games the communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium is de ned to be the problem of nding an ϵ-Nash equilibrium, when Alice holds the utility function of player 1, and Bob holds the utility function of player 2. We prove the following result: Theorem 1. There exists a constant ϵ > 0 such that the randomized communication complexity (BPP cc ) of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in twoplayer N × N games is at least N ϵ .
For n-player games, we consider a two-party communication problem where the set of players [n] is divided into two disjoint subsets [n] = n A ⊍ n B . Alice holds the utilities of the players in n A , and Bob holds the utilities of the players in n B . In particular, this communication problem is easier than the n-parties communication problem where each player holds his own utility function. Our negative result holds for the notion of weak approximate Nash equilibrium [BPR16] , which in particular implies the same negative result for the standard notion of approximate Nash equilibrium (see also De nition 3).
Theorem 2. There exists a constant ϵ > 0 such that the randomized communication complexity (BPP cc ) of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games is at least 2 ϵn .
The formal proofs appear in Section 4. Below we present the main ideas of the proof.
Overview of the Proofs
As mentioned in the Introduction, the proof consists of four main steps. Below we present the ideas of each step.
ery Complexity of End-of-any-Line. Our proof starts with the following query complexity hardness result (Lemma 4.1): There exists a constant degree graph G = (V , E) with 2 Θ(n) vertices, such that nding the end of a line in G requires 2 Ω(n) queries.
In fact, we prove the hardness result for directed graph G where each vertex has outgoing and incoming degree 2. Therefore, the successor and predecessor of each vertex are binary variables. In particular, for each ∈ V , the information about its role in the line can be represented using only three bits, which we denote
(a) Whether the line goes trough , which is denoted by T ( ), (b) Who is the successor of (if in on the line), which is denoted by S( ), (c) Who is the predecessor of (if in on the line), which is denoted by P( ).
Lemma ( E L; informal). Finding an end of a line with high probability, requires 2 Ω(n) queries to I .
Proving hardness for randomized query complexity is quite easy (see Lemma 4.1). This can be "lifted" to a lower bound on the randomized communication complexity via the simulation theorem of [AGJ + 17, GPW17] .
From ery Complexity to Communication Complexity. We use a recent simulation theorem to "lift" our randomized query complexity lower bound to a randomized communication complexity bound.
The simulated communicationally hard problem has the following form. For each ∈ V , Alice holds a triplet of vec-
, and Bob holds a reasonably small input which is just a triplet of indexes 
Finding an end of a line requires 2 Ω(n) bits of communication.
Embedding as a Continuous Function. Our next step is to reduce the problem of nding an end of a line to that of nding a Brouwer xed point. Here, we use a recent construction of a hard function by [Rub16] , which improved over the classic construction of Hirsch et al [HPV89] . 
(1) The computation of f can be done using local information about I . Namely, for points that are close to x it is su cient to know I ( ) to compute f . For points that are close to a path that corresponds to the edge ( , w) but far from the points x , xw it is su cient to know whether ( , w) is an edge in the line (in particular, knowing either I (u) or I ( ) su ces). For points that are far from all paths ( , w), f does not depend on I at all (thus can be computed without any communication). (2) Any (normalized) ⋅ 2 -approximate xed point of f can be mapped (e ciently) back to an end of some line in I . Property 1 induces the following e cient communication protocol for computing f (x): Bob nds such that x is close to x , and sends β T , , β S, , β T , ; Alice replies with
, and they each use I ( ) to locally compute f (x). (Similarly, if x is close to the path corresponding to edge ( , w), they use a similar protocol to compute I ( ) and I (w).)
By Property 2, we have:
Two-Player Game. Naively thinking, we would like to design a game where Alice chooses a point
and Bob chooses a point y ∈ [−1, 2] Θ(n) (on the ε-grid). Alice's utility will be given by − x − y 2 2 , and Bob's utility will be given by 4 − y − f (x) 2 2 . Then, by applying similar arguments to those in [MT05, Shm12, Bab14, Rub16] we can deduce that every approximate Nash equilibrium corresponds to an approximate xed point, and thus also to an end of a line. However, the above idea is obviously incorrect because Bob's utility depends on f , whereas in the communication problem his utility should depend on the βs only. Our key idea is to use the fact that f can be computed locally to design a somewhat similar game where similar phenomena to those in the "naive" game will occur in approximate equilibria.
Bob doesn't know f , but to compute f (x) he should only know the local information about the vertex (or vertices) that correspond to x. We incentivize Alice and Bob to combine their private information about the corresponding vertex (or vertices) by the following utilities structure.
• Alice's rst component of utility is given by − x − y 2 2 . As in the "naive" game, in any approximate Nash equilibrium Alice will play points in the ϵ-cube of the ϵ-grid that contains E[y] with probability close to one. 4 Note that here it is crucial that we use the normalized ⋅ 2 to obtain payo s bounded in [−9, 0]; using the non-normalized ⋅ 2 we get payo s in [− √ n, 0].
• Bob tries to guess the vertex (or the vertices , w) that correspond to the point x. Since x (almost always) belongs to the same ϵ-cube, in any (approximate) Nash equilibrium, his guess should be correct (with high probability). In addition, Bob should announce the β indexes β T , β S and β P of (of and w). Again, we incentivize him to do so by de ning that he should "guess" also these β indexes, and in an (approximate) equilibrium his guess should be correct (w.h.p).
• We want Alice to announce I ( ) (similarly for w in case of two vertices). Thus, we ask her to guess the decomposition α B (β B ) where B and β B are the announced and β by Bob. In (approximate) equilibrium, since Bob announces the correct and β (w.h.p), this incentivizes her to announce the correct I ( ) (w.h.p).
• Now Bob uses the local information of I ( ) (and I (w)) to compute f . Namely, his last utility component is de-
where f I A ( ), I A (w ) is Bob's "estimation" of f under the relevant local information announced by Alice. In (approximate) equilibrium Alice announces the correct local information (w.h.p), thus Bob computes f correctly (w.h.p).
Summarizing, the (approximate) equilibrium analysis of the presented game is similar to the analysis of the naive game, because in (approximate) equilibrium f is computed correctly (w.h.p). But unlike the naive game, here Alice's utility depends only on the αs and Bob's utility only on the βs. n-Player Game: ϵ-WSNE. The n-player game reduction is based on the same ideas as the two-player reduction. For clarity, we present rst the idea of a reduction that proves the following weaker result:
There exists a constant ϵ > 0 such that the communication complexity of ϵ-well supported approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player games with constant number of actions for each player is at least 2 cn for some constant c.
After that, we explain how we can strengthen this result in two aspects: rst to improve the constant-number-of-action to binaryaction, second to improve the ϵ-well supported Nash equilibrium to (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate equilibrium.
The idea is to replace a single player-Alice-who chooses
each player px i in the population is responsible for the ith coordinate of x. The payo of player px i is given by − x i − i 2 . This incentivizes player px i to play either a single, or two adjacent actions, in the ϵ-grid of the segment [−1, 2] (in every WSNE). By looking at the action pro le of all px i players we get the same phenomenon as in the two-player case: every point x in the support of Alice's players belongs to the same ϵ-cube of the ϵ-grid. Now, we replace the guess of ∈ {0, 1} Θ(n) , that is done by Bob, by population of size Θ(n) where again each player is responsible to a single coordinate of . Again in a WSNE all players will guess correctly. 
The analysis of this game is very similar to the two-player game analysis.
n-Player Game: (ϵ, ϵ)-Weak ANE and Binary Actions. In the above reduction, the x-type (and y-type players) have 3 ϵ actions each. To construct a binary action game we use the technique of [Bab14] . We replace each such player by a population of 3 ϵ players, each is located at a point in the ϵ-grid of the segment [−1, 2]. Player that is located at j ∈ [−1, 2] (on the ϵ-grid) has to choose between the two points j or j + ϵ. In a WSNE all players are located from the left of i will choose j + ϵ, and all players are located from the right of i will choose j.
More tricky, is to generalize this reduction to weak approximate equilibria. Recall that in weak approximate equilibria, a constant fraction of players may play an arbitrary suboptimal action. Here we take into account both,
(1) Players that are not ϵ-best replying, and (2) Players that are ϵ-best replying, but put small positive weight on the inferior action (among the two) and the realization of their mixed action turned out to be the inferior action.
In order to be immune from these, irrational, small constant fraction of players, we use error correcting codes 5 . Let E β :{0, 1} 3 log M → {0, 1} Θ(3 log M ) be a good binary error correcting code. Instead of having a population of size 3 log M which tries to guess β, we replace it by a population of size Θ(3 log M) where each player tries to guess his bit in the encoding of β. Now even if a small constant fraction of players will act irrationally, the decoding of the action pro le of the β-type players will turn out to be β. We use the same idea for all types of populations (x-type, y-type, -type and I -type). This idea completes the reduction for weak approximate equilibria.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation. We use 0n (respectively 1n ) to denote the length-n vectors whose value is 0 (1) in every coordinate. For vectors x, y ∈ R n , we let
denote the normalized 2-norm. Unless speci ed otherwise, when we say that x and y are ∆-close (or ∆-far), we mean ∆-close in normalized 2-norm.
5
In fact, we use error correcting codes even earlier, in [Rub16] 's modi cation construction of hard Brouwer function.
Di erent Notions of Approximate Nash Equilibrium
A mixed strategy of player i is a distribution x i over i's set of actions, A i . We say that a vector of mixed strategies x ∈ × j ∆A j is a Nash equilibrium if every strategy a i in the support of every x i is a best response to the actions of the mixed strategies of the rest of the players, x −i . Formally, for every a i ∈ supp (x i )
Equivalently, x is a Nash equilibrium if each mixed strategy x i is a best response to x −i :
Each of those equivalent de nitions can be generalized to include approximation in a di erent way.
De nition 1 (ϵ-Approximate Nash Equilibrium). We say that x is an ϵ-Approximate Nash Equilibrium (ϵ-ANE) if each x i is an ϵ-best response to x −i :
On the other hand, we generalize the rst de nition of Nash equilibrium in the following stricter de nition:
We can further relax the (already more lenient) notion of ϵ-ANE by requiring that the ϵ-best response condition only hold for most of the players (rather than all of them). . There exists M = poly(N ) such that for any constants 0 < δ < 1 2,
PROOFS
In Section 4.1 we prove a randomized query lower bound for the end-of-the-line problem. In Section 4.2 we show how the lower bounds of Sections 4.1 can be "lifted" to get a hard problem in the randomized communication complexity models. In Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 we reduce the communicationally hard end-of-any-line problem to the approximate Nash equilibrium problem.
A Randomized Query Complexity Lower Bound
Let G be a directed graph with the vertices V = {0,
, where 1 , 2 ∈ {0, 1} n and k ∈ [n], has two outgoing edges to the vertices
= ( 1 , 2 , n + 1) has a single outgoing edge to the vertex ( 2 , 1 , 0). Note that the incoming degree of each vertex = ( 1 , 2 , k) ∈ V is at most two. For k = 1 there is a single incoming edge from ( 2 , 1 , n + 1). For k > 1 there are two incoming edges from ( 1 ,
We de ne the E L ( E L) to be the problem of nding the end of a line in G that starts at the point 0 2n+1 . More formally, we represent a line in G by a triple I ( ) ≜ (T ( ), S( ), P( )) where T ( ) ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the line goes through , S( ) ∈ {0, 1} indicates who is the successor of , and P( ) ∈ {0, 1} indicates who is the predecessor of (here we use the fact that each vertex has outgoing and incoming degree of at most two). Throughout the paper, we slightly abuse notation and use S( )/P( ) to refer both to the bits, and to the corresponding vertices (i.e. the S( )/P( )-successor/predecessor of ). The end of the line is the vertex * such that T (
De nition 4. The problem E L is given by Input: A line I = (T , S, P) over the graph G that starts at the point 0 2n+1 . Output: The rst bit ([ * ] 1 ) of the end of the line vertex.
Queries: Each query is a vertex ∈ V . The answer is the triplet of bits I ( ) = (T ( ), S( ), P( )) ∈ {0, 1} 3 .
P . By Yao's Minmax Theorem it is su cient to introduce a distribution over paths such every deterministic query algorithm requires Ω(2 n ) queries to determine the rst bit of the end of line vertex with probability of at least 1 − δ . We choose a permutation π over {0, 1} n ∖ {0n } uniformly at random, and set π (0) ≜ 0n . π induces a line of length Θ (2 n ⋅ n) over G, starting at 0 2n+1 , ending at (π (2 n − 1), π (2 n − 1), 0), and where two consecutive vertices = π (i) and w = π (i + 1) are mapped to the following line of n + 1 edges:
.
This proves that the latter problem requires Ω(2 n ) queries.
Communicationally Hard, Discrete End-of-the-Line Problem
In order to use a simulation theorem (Theorem 3) for randomized communication complexity), we de ne the following simulation variant of E L:
and Bob receives three indices
We de ne
, and P( ) = α P (β P ).
(1)
We simulate the problem E L, therefore we restrict attention to inputs such that (T , S, P) that are de ned in (1) meet all the requirements of E L. Output: The rst bit ([ * ] 1 ) of a non-trivial end or start of a line
Applying the randomized Simulation Theorem (Theorem 3) to the query complexity lower bound (Lemma 4.1) gives a lower bound on the randomized communication complexity of a discrete end of line problem S E L.
Embedding a Line as a Local Lipschitz Function
It will be more convenient to de ne G as a graph over {0, 1} 2n+log(n+1) .
Let m = Θ(2n + log(n + 1)) = Θ (n) and let E∶ {0, 1} 2n+log(n+1) → {0, 1} m denote the encoding function of a good binary error correcting code. We embed the discrete graph G into the continuous cube [−1, 2] 4m .
The vertex is embedded to the point (E( ), E( ), 0m, 0m ) ∈ [−1, 2] 4m , which is called the embedded vertex.
For two vertices , w ∈ V such that ( , w) is an edge in the graph G, we de ne ve vertices:
Note that x 1 ( , w) is the embedded vertex , x 5 ( , w) is the embedded vertex w. The line that connects the points x i ( , w) and x i+1 ( , w) is called a Brouwer line segment. The union of these four Brouwer line segments is called the embedded edge ( , w). It is not hard to check that non-consecutive Brouwer line segments are Ω(1)-far one from the other, and in particular it implies that non-consecutive embedded edges are su ciently far one from the other.
The following Proposition shows that the end-of-any-line problem can be reduced to the problem of nding an approximate xed point of a continuous Lipschitz function, when the function is "local" in the following sense: every edge in G is embedded as a path in the continuous hypercube (as described above). For points close to the embedding of an edge, f depends only on the "local behaviour" of the lines I at the endpoints of this edge; for all other points, f is independent of the lines I .
Proposition 1 (Essentially [Rub16] ). There exist constants δ, h > 0 such that given a line I = (T , S, P) over G there exists a function
with the following properties: (1) f (x) − x 2 > δ for every x that in not h-close to the embedded edge of any non-trivial end or start of a line (i.e., the embedding of the edge (P( * ), * ) such that T ( * ) = 1 but T (S( * )) = 0; or the edge ( * , S( * )) for * such that T (P( * )) = 0, T ( * ) = 1, and * ≠ 0 2n+1 ).
(3) f is local in the sense that it can be de ned as an interpolation between a few (in fact, 64) functions, {f
, that do not depend on the lines I and such that: (a) If the rst m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-close to the encoded vertex E( ), but the second m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-far from any encoded vertex E(w) then f I ( ), I 2 (x) = f (x) for every I 2 ∈ {0, 1} 3 .
(b) If the second m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-close to the encoded vertex E(w), but the rst m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-far from any encoded vertex E( ) then f I 1 , I (w ) (x) = f (x) for every I 1 ∈ {0, 1} 3 .
(c) If the rst m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-close to the encoded vertex E( ), and the second m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-close to the encoded vertex E(w) then f (I ( ), I (w ) (x) = f (x). (d) If none of the above conditions are satis ed, then f I 1 , I 2 (x) = f (x) for every I 1 , I 2 ∈ {0, 1} 3 .
A very similar proposition was recently proved in [Rub16] . Property (3) in Proposition 1 di ers a little from the way "locality" is formalized in [Rub16] , but it is an immediate consequence of the construction. The proof of Proposition 1 appear in the Appendix of the full version of the paper [BR16] .
Two-Player Game
Theorem (Theorem 1, restated) . There exists a constant ϵ > 0 such that the communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games is at least N ϵ .
We construct a two-player game between Alice and Bob of size
such that Alice's utility depends on {α T , α S , α P } only, Bob's utility depends on {β T , β S , β P } only, and all ϵ 4 -approximate Nash equilibria of the game correspond to a δ -xed point of f from Proposition 1. By property 1 in Proposition 1, any xed point of f corresponds to a non-trivial end or start of a line in I .
The game.
In this subsection we construct our reduction from S E L to the problem of nding an ϵ-WSNE.
Strategies. Recall that δ is the desired approximation parameter for Brouwer xed point in the construction of Proposition 1. We let ϵ be a su ciently small constant; in particular, ϵ = O(δ ) (this will be important later for Inequality (10)).
Each of Alice's actions corresponds to an ordered tuple (x, I
A , I
A w ), where:
, where the interval [−1, 2] is discretized into {−1, −1 + ϵ, . . . , 2 − ϵ, 2}; Utilities. Alice's and Bob's utilities decompose as
The rst component of Alice's utility depends only on the rst components of her and Bob's strategies; it is given by: Note that Bob knows the indexes β T , β S , β P (for every ), thus to achieve U B G = 1 Bob needs to guess correctly only the vertices D (x), Dw (x) and announce the corresponding triplet of β indexes.
Going back to Alice, the second component of her utility is given by U A G V = 1 i she guesses correctly the triplet I (
) when the calculation of T , S, P is done by where the function f I 1 , I 2 is de ned in Proposition 1.
Analysis of the Game.
In this subsection, we prove the reduction from S E L to nding an ϵ 4 -ANE. The proof proceeds via a sequence of lemmas that establish the structure of any ϵ 4 -ANE. = O ϵ 2 with probability of at least 1 − ϵ 2 (where the probability is taken over A). Note that in every ϵ 4 -ANE Alice assigns a probability of at most 1 − ϵ 2 to actions that are ϵ 2 -far from optimal. By Equation (2) this implies that the probability of Alice to choose a vector x that satis es x − E (B) 
with probability of at least 1 − O(ϵ 4 ) (where the probability is taken over B).
P . By Lemma 4.2 and the triangle inequality, with probability of at least 1 − ϵ 2 , the rst m-tuple of x is O (h)-close to E( ).
Rounding to R (x) ∈ {0, 1} m can at most double the distance to E( ) in each coordinate. Therefore, the Hamming distance of R (x) and E( ) is O (h). Hence R (x) is correctly decoded as D (x) = , with probability of at least 1 − ϵ 2 .
W , Bob's utility from guessing B = , and
Whereas his utility from guessing any other guess is at most ϵ 2 .
Therefore, Bob assigns probability at least 1−ϵ 4 (1−2ϵ 2 ) to actions that satisfy (3).
Similarly, for the second m-tuple of x and the vertex w, we have: with probability of at least 1 − O(ϵ 4 ) (where the probability is taken over B).
Since Alice receives the correct B and β B , we also have: nates of E y∼B [y] is 6h-close to the binary encoding E( ) of a vertex , then
with probability 1 − O(ϵ 4 ) (where the probability is over A and B). The following corollary completes the analysis of two-player games.
Corollary 3. For every ϵ 4 -ANE (A; B) we have
P . We recall that in Lemma 4.2 we have proved that
with probability 1 − O(ϵ 2 ). This also implies that x is, with high probability, close to its expectation:
with probability 1 − O(ϵ 2 ). Where the rst inequality follows form the Triangle ineqaultiy, the second follows from the Arithmetic-Mean Geometric-Mean inequality AM-GM ineqaulty, the third follows from convexity of ⋅ 2 2 , and the last follows from Lemma 4.2.
Using that f is O(1)-Lipschitz together with Equation (5), we get that
with probability 1 − O(ϵ 2 ).
By Lemma 4.7 we know that f I A , I A w (x) = f (x) with probability 1 − O(ϵ 2 ), which implies that
Using similar arguments to those of Lemma 4.2 we deduce that
with probability 1 − O(ϵ 2 ). As in the derivation of Equation (5), this implies:
With probability 1 − O(ϵ 2 ) Inequalities (5),(4),(9),(8), (7), (6) hold simultaneously. In such a case, by the triangle inequality and by applying the inequalities in the exact above order, we have
P T 1. Any communication protocol that solves the ϵ 4 -Nash equilibrium problem in games of size N × N for N = 2 Θ(n) induces a communication protocol for the problem S E L: Alice constructs her utility in the above presented game using her private information of the αs. Bob constructs his utility using the βs. They implement the communication protocol to nd an ϵ 4 -Nash equilibrium. Then both of them know E x∼A [x] which is a δ -approximate xed point of f (by Corollary 3). Using D they decode the vertex * and they know the rst coordinate of * .
By Corollary 2, the communication complexity of ϵ 4 -Nash equilibrium in games of size 2 Θ(n) × 2 Θ(n) is at least 2 Ω(n) .
n-Player Game
Theorem (Theorem 2, restated). There exists a constant ϵ > 0 such that the communication complexity of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games is at least 2 ϵn .
The proof follows similar lines to those in the proof of Theorem 1. Rather than two players whose actions correspond to Θ(n)-long vectors, we have a player for each bit of the encoded vectors. We construct a game with 8m
′ -players for m ′ = Θ(n) such that Alice holds the utility function of (the rst) 3m ′ players, Bob holds the utilities of (the last) 5m ′ players, Alice's players utilities depend only on the αs, Bob's utilities depend only on the βs, and every ϵ 5 82, ϵ 5 82 -weak approximate Nash equilibrium corresponds to a δ -xed point of the function f from Proposition 1.
Players and Actions. In section 4.4 we have used error correcting code to encode vertices that are deduced from x and y. Here, since we consider weak approximate equilibria, we should add additional encodings for I A , I A , B , w B , β B and β B w . Since we want to use the same number of players for each of the above objects, it will be convenient to encode them in the same space {0, 1} m ′ . We let the following be encoding functions of binary error correcting codes with constant (relative) distance:
Let E and m denote encoding function and block length of the error correcting code from Section 4.3, i.e.:
For vectors x, y ∈ [−1, 2] 4m , we use (3 ϵ − 1) bits to encode each continuous coordinate (up to precision ϵ) in unary encoding. We choose m ′ such that m ′ = 4(3 ϵ − 1)m, so the encoding of each of x, y also takes m ′ bits. For E β , we must also have m ′ > 3 log M.
Here and henceforth, ϵ is a su ciently small constant, satisfying ϵ = Θ(δ ).
Instead of having a single player, Alice, with actions
we replace her by 3m ′ players with binary actions. We have three types of Alice players:
• x-type players. Player x i j chooses one of the actions a i j ∈ {j, j + ϵ} for every i ∈ [4m] and j ∈ {−1, −1 + ϵ, . . . , 2 − 2ϵ, 2 − ϵ}. Note that the total number of x-type players is 4m( 3 ϵ − 1) = m ′ .
• I -type and I w -type players. Player I i chooses a bit 0 or 1 for every i ∈ [m ′ ]. Similarly for I w -type players.
In the communication problem, we assume that Alice knows the utilities of all the above players.
Instead of having a single player, Bob, with actions
we replace him by 5m ′ players with binary actions. We have ve types of players:
• y-type players. Player y i j chooses one of the actions b i j ∈ {j, j + ϵ} for every i ∈ [4m] and j ∈ {−1, −1 + ϵ, . . . , 2 − 2ϵ, 2 − ϵ}.
• -type players. Player i chooses a bit 0 or 1 for every i ∈ [m ′ ]. Similarly for w-type players.
• β -type players. Player β i chooses a bit 0 or 1 for every i ∈ [m ′ ]. Similarly for β w -type players.
In the communication problem, we assume that Bob knows the utilities of all the above players.
Utilities. Before getting to the description of the utilities we de ne the notions of realized number and realized point by a set of players. For every i ∈ [m], for simplicity of notations we add a dummy player x (1) x-type/ y-type players' utilities are de ned with respect to the realized points of the opponents. In addition, player that is responsible to the i-th coordinate of the point pays the distance from the i-th coordinate of the opponent's point/the ith coordinate of the f operation of the opponent's point. (2) For all other types, the i-th player chooses the value of the i-th bit in the (alleged) codeword in {0, 1}
Formally the payo s are de ned as follows:
• For x-type players, U a) ) )] i . Namely, the i-th player tries to guess the i-th coordinate of the encoded vector E β (β S ), were , as in the previous bullet, is computed using decoding. Similarly we de ne the utilities of β w -type players.
• For a I -type player I i , we de ne
where is the decoded vertex announced by -type players and β is the decoded vector of indexes announced by β -type players. Similarly we de ne the utilities of I w -type players.
• For y-type players,
2 , where I and I w are the decoding of the vertices announced by I -type and I w -type players. We recall that the function f I , I w is de ned in Proposition 1. with high probability 6 (the probability is over the mixed strategy of the x-type players).
P . We say that player
similarly, we say that action j + ϵ is wrong
Note that if for some coordinate i, no player x i j plays a wrong action, then the realized number r i (a i ) is ϵ-close to
. We show that indeed in an (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate equilibrium we will have many such coordinates i. Recall that player x i j 's utility when she plays j is given by
Similarly, when she plays j + ϵ her utility is given by
When j is wrong (i.e.
Here and throughout this section, we use "with high probability" to mean with probability approaching 1 as n grows (in fact, with an exponential dependence); in particular, the probability is approaching 1 faster than any polynomial in ϵ .
When j + ϵ is wrong (i.e.,
Therefore, player x i j can always increase her payo by at least ϵ 2 by deviating from a wrong action. Note that if player x i j is ϵ-best replying, she assigns a probability of at most ϵ ϵ 2 to a wrong action. In addition, the fraction of x-type players that are not ϵ-best replying is at most 8ϵ (because we have 8 types of players of equal cardinality). Therefore, in the expected fraction of x-type players playing a wrong is at most 8ϵ + 2ϵ ϵ 2 < 2.5ϵ ϵ 2 . Therefore, with high probability over x-type players mixed strategies, at most a 3ϵ ϵ 2 -fraction play a wrong action (e.g. by Cherno bound). Therefore the fraction of coordinates i ∈ [4m] where at least one player x i j plays a wrong action is at most 9ϵ ϵ 3 (because we have 3 ϵ players in each coordinate). So in (1 − 9ϵ ϵ 3 ) fraction of coordinates
The analogue of Lemma 4.3 is the following. (1) The decoding of the action pro le of the -type players is with probability 1 − o(ϵ). (2) The decoding of the action pro le of the β -type players is (β T , β S , β P ) with probability 1 − o(ϵ). Every player that is ϵ-best replying, assigns probability of at least 1 − O(ϵ) to the correct bit. In addition, we have at most 8ϵ fraction of -type players who are not ϵ-best replying (because we have 8 types of players of equal cardinality). Therefore the expected fraction of -type players who play the wrong bit is O(ϵ). By Cherno bound, it also holds that with high probability at most an O(ϵ)-fraction of -type players play the wrong bit. Whenever this is the case, is indeed decoded correctly.
Similarly we prove the second claim in the lemma for β -type players.
In a similar way we can show that analogues of Lemmas 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 hold for the n-player game. In particular, with high probability. This, in particular, implies that r (a) is, with high probability, close to its expectation: 
with high probability. Where the rst inequality follows from Triangle inequality, second follows from convexity, and the last is Lemma 4.8. Using the O(1)-Lipschitzness of f we deduce that
with high probability. Using similar arguments to those of Lemma 4.8 we deduce that
with high probability, where we recall that I , I w denote the decoded line information of the action pro le played by the I , I wtypes players. By an analogous argument to (13),
with high probability. By Lemma 4.10,
By Equations (13),(12), (17) , (16), (18), (15) (applied exactly in this order) and the triangle inequality we get
P T 2. Any communication protocol that solves the (ϵ 5 82, ϵ 5 82)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium problem in Θ(n)-player games with binary actions induces a communication protocol for the problem S E L: Alice constructs the utilities of her players using her private information of the αs, Bob constructs his utility using the βs. They implement the communication protocol to nd an (ϵ 5 82, ϵ 5 82)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, and then both of them know E a∼A [r (a)] which is a δ -approximate xed point of f (by Corollary 4). Finally, they round and decode the approximate xed point to get an end or start of a line. Using Corollary 2 we deduce that the communication complexity of (ϵ 5 82, ϵ 5 82)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium problem in Θ(n)-player games with binary actions is at least 2 Ω(n) .
AN OPEN PROBLEM: CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA IN 2-PLAYER GAMES
As mentioned in Section 1.3, it is known that for n-player, O(1)-action games, even exact correlated equilibrium can be found with poly(n) deterministic communication complexity (see [HM10, PR08, JLB15] ). In two-player N × N games, for approximate correlated equilibrium with constant value of approximation, to the best of our knowledge, no non-trivial results are known (neither positive nor negative). Does a polylog(N ) communication protocol for approximate correlated equilibrium exist? Is there a poly(N ) communication lower bound? For small values of approximation, recently [GS17] have shown that 1 N -correlated equilibrium requires poly(N ) communication.
